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Two-player games have had a long and fruitful history of applications stretching across the social, 
biological, and physical sciences.  Most applications of two-player games assume synchronous 
decisions or moves even when the games are iterated.  But different strategies may emerge as 
preferred when the decisions or moves are sequential, or the games are iterated.  Zero-determinant 
strategies developed by Press and Dyson are a new class of strategies that have been developed 
for synchronous two-player games, most notably the iterated prisoner’s dilemma.  Here we apply 
the Press-Dyson analysis to sequential or asynchronous two-player games.  We focus on the 
asynchronous prisoner’s dilemma.  As a first application of the Press-Dyson analysis of the 
asynchronous prisoner’s dilemma, tit-for-tat is shown to be an efficient defense against 
extortionate zero-determinant strategies. Nice strategies like tit-for-tat are also shown to lead to 
Pareto optimal payoffs for both players in repeated prisoner’s dilemma.    
1. Introduction 
 
The theory of games has its modern genesis in a classic book published in 1944 by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern [1].   Since then significant work by many researchers further 
developed the theory with applications to the social, behavioral, biological, and physical sciences.  
Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is a game developed in 1950 at RAND by Flood and Dresher [2].  Since 
its formal inception, PD has provided much insight and sometimes bafflement in understanding 
the resolution, and even intensification, of conflict and the development of cooperation in the real 
world.  Axelrod describes many of the strategies used in attempts to solve the PD and reports on 
“tournaments” to test various strategies developed by himself and many others [3].  Sigmund has 
recently given a short, accessible book that treats PD as well as other classic games focusing on 
an evolutionary approach [4].  Recently, Cleveland, Liao, and Austin have applied a game theory 
approach, including PD, to the physics of cancer propagation [5].  Finally, the work of Brams [6] 
develops a dynamic theory of moves that includes PD and that has been applied to real world 
conflicts [7].  The wide scope and long history of game theory, prisoner’s dilemma, and 
applications makes it surprising that a new technique and class of strategies for PD were recently 
discovered by Press and Dyson [8].  This discovery led to a resurgence of interest and new 
applications of the prisoner’s dilemma, mostly in evolutionary biology [9].  The main purpose of 
this article is to extend the Press-Dyson analysis to a model of PD [10] that is sequential, 
asynchronous, and compatible with the theory of moves [6,7]. 
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II.  Payoff Matrices for Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 Prisoner’s dilemma is developed around a landscape of payoffs for the players that is 
succinctly described in terms of an 2X2 matrix with ordered pair elements.  This matrix captures 
both the decisions and the payoffs of the players [1-4,6].  Fig. 1 gives a standard form of the matrix. 
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Figure 1. See text for discussion.                                                
 
In Fig. 1, the two players are labeled X and Y.  Player X is blue, and Y is red.  Strategies of play 
for the players are labeled by c (cooperate) and d (defect).  The verb cooperate means a move that 
the moving player judges to lead to a positive result for both players while defect means a move 
that the moving player judges to lead to a positive result for the moving player but a negative result 
for the other player.  The ordered pairs in the four quadrants enclosed by brackets are payoffs of 
the two players based on the externality of interest.  This can be a preference rank or a payoff.  The 
language of payoffs will be used below.  The first entry of the ordered pair corresponds to the 
payoff for player X, the second entry to the payoff for player Y.  If each player cooperates the 
payoff is R to each.  If each player defects the payoff is P to each.  If one player cooperates and 
the other player defects, then the player that cooperates gets payoff S and the player that defects 
get payoff T.  The classic PD puts the following two conditions on the four payoffs:  T R P S    
and 2R T S  .  The first condition ensures that mutual defection with payoff  ,P P  is a Nash 
equilibrium [1,4,11].  The second condition ensures that mutual-cooperation with payoff  ,R R  
is the best outcome of the four ordered pairs, a Pareto optimal payoff for both players with the two 
payoff sets mentioned below [4,6].  There are no other conditions on the payoffs for the PD except 
that the payoffs are drawn from integers including zero.  Axelrod [3] emphasized the payoff set 
   , , , 5,3,1,0T R P S   while Brams emphasized     , , , 4,3,2,1T R P S  .  Other asynchronous 
models place additional conditions (eg,  T S R P   ) on the payoff set and are not considered 
here [12].  The matrix in Fig. 1 includes both player payoffs (ordered pairs) and player moves (c 
or d).  The move information is included twice, once by the color code and once by the c or d 
designation to the top and left of the array of ordered pairs.  Analysis of the structure of the matrices 
for general 2X2 games can be quite complex and rich with interpretation [6,7,13,14].  Here we 
consider only the matrix in Fig. 1.   The color code of payoffs is used to be clear regarding which 
payoffs are associated with which player.  However, the payoffs themselves can be different for 
the different players. 
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III. Asynchronous Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 von Neumann and Morgenstern understood that some form of repeated play was necessary 
for game theory to correspond to real conflicts [1].  One attempt to address this issue was the 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) with repeated play of the PD and synchronous moves of players 
X and Y [3,4,8].  The assumptions of the IPD result in transition probability matrices for player 
moves that are Markov with row entries adding to unity.   Markov chains then is the underlying 
mathematical theory for IPD [15,16].   This results in the need to define probabilities for moving 
for both players called player strategies based on the outcome of the previous game.  Probabilities 
based only on memory of the preceding game (memory-1 probabilities) are sufficient to define the 
rules of play [8].   Press and Dyson developed an analytic technique based on the structure of the 
transition matrices and associated determinants for the IPD that proves one player (or even both),  
by selecting certain playing strategies, can establish a linear relation between the average payoffs 
for both players.  This simple linear relation was new to game theory and led to much activity, for 
example [9,17,18].  Synchronous player moves have long been recognized as a limitation when 
applying IPD [6,7,10,12].  Here a version of an Asynchronous Prisoner’s Dilemma (APD) due to 
Frean [10] is analyzed with the Press-Dyson analysis to show that a linear relation between average 
payoffs exist in the APD with properly selected playing strategies. 
  
 Fig. 2 shows the essential ideas of the APD. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Asynchronous Prisoner’s Dilemma (adapted from Frean [10]).  X  
moves are on bottom; Y moves are on top.  X moves at N-3, N-1, N+1 …; Y 
moves at N-2, N, N+2 …. Moves are asynchronous and sequential.  Payoffs use 
T, R, P, S notation with X payoffs in blue on bottom and Y payoffs in red on top.  
Player moves are indicated by c and d in usual color and located near dotted line 
demarking moves.  Players move with memory of the last move of the other player 
and that of themselves (memory-1 moves).  Payoff to a player is determined by 
the player’s last move and the other player’s previous move.  Specific moves and 
payoffs are examples.  “Move” can also be interpreted as “time” [15,16]. 
 
From Fig. 2, player Y at move N cooperates (c) based on memory of X’s defection (d) at move N-
1 and Y’s defection (d) at N-2.  The resulting payoff for Y is S according to the payoff array in 
Fig. 1.  At move N+1, player X cooperates (c) based on Y’s cooperation at move N and X’s  
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defection at move N-1.  The resulting payoff for X is T according to Fig. 1.   In general, the 4-
vector  1 2 3 4, , ,p p p pp  is the strategy of player X. ip  are transition probabilities for player X 
to cooperate in the current game so 0 1ip   .  The 4-vector  1 3 2 4, , ,q q p pq  is the strategy of 
player Y.  iq  are also transition probabilities for player Y to cooperate in the current game so 
0 1iq  .  The Markov transition matrix XM for player X moving along the bottom of Fig. 2 is 
given by Frean [10] and reproduced in the Appendix, Eq. (A1), with further explanation.  The 
Markov transition matrix YM  for player Y moving along the top of Fig. 2 is also in the Appendix, 
Eq. (A2).   The Markov matrix 1 X YM M M  in the Appendix, Eq. (A3), is the transition 
probability matrix for the asynchronous, sequential game involving two players with player X 
moving first [10,12].  The Markov matrix  2 Y XM M M  in the Appendix, Eq. (A4), is the 
transition probability matrix for the asynchronous, sequential game with player Y moving first 
[10].  The following analysis of these transition probability matrices for the APD in Fig. 2 follows 
Press and Dyson [8].  The form of transition matrices do not depend on the exact payoffs so do not 
depend on the conditions of the PD. 
 
Both 1M  and 2M  have a unit eigenvalue.  The matrices i i M M I  are both singular 
with zero determinants and stationary row eigenvectors iv  so i i v M 0  for 1, 2i  .   Cramer’s 
rule then implies that    i i iAdj det M M M I 0  where Adj refers to the adjugate matrix.    The 
average of an arbitrary vector f given by the transpose  T 1 2 3 4, , ,f f f ff  is expressed in terms 
of the stationary (probability) vectors by 
 
 i i , ,i D  v p q ff f .                                                                       (1) 
 
The determinants iD  are given by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 1 1 1 2 1
2 3 2 2 4 2
1
3 1 3 3 2 3
4 3 4 4 4 4
1 1 1
1 1
, , det
1 1
1
p q p p q f
p q p p q f
D
p q p p q f
p q p p q f
    
  

  

p q f ,                     (2) 
and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 1 2 1 1 1
1 3 2 3 3 2
2
3 2 4 2 2 3
3 4 4 4 4 4
1 1 1
1 1
, , det
1 1
1
p q p q q f
p q p q q f
D
p q p q q f
p q p q q f
    
  

  

p q f .                    (3) 
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The two determinants  i , ,D p q f  are each obtained from the matrices iM  with the fourth column 
removed and replaced by f .  Furthermore,  1 , ,D p q f  has the first column of 1M  added to its 
second column, and  2 , ,D p q f  has the first column of 2M added to its third column.  Inspection 
of the determinants  i , ,D p q f shows that each has one column that can be under the control of 
one player.  This means that zero-determinant strategies (ZDS) are possible [8].  A difference 
between this APD and the IPD of Press and Dyson is that Eqs. (2) and (3) show that only player 
X can implement a ZDS strategy when X moves first, and only player Y when Y moves first. 
 
  The payoff vector for player X is  , , ,X R S T PS  and that for player Y is 
 , , ,Y R T S PS .  The average payoffs are 
         
 
 
TT
i ki k
k i
i i
, ,
, ,
S
D
D
 


p q Sv S
v p q 11
                                                     (4) 
 
where T denotes transpose, 1, 2i   and ,k X Y  .   There are then four average payoffs, two for 
each player and two for each order of play.  A Markov chain implies that the number of moves is 
large.  In the resulting “fog of play”, knowledge of which player moved first is obscured or lost.  
This means that the final payoffs for each player are obtained by equal weighted averages [10], 
 
 1 212k k kS S S  ,                                                                           (5) 
 
,k X Y .   To implement ZDS when player X moves first, X choses a strategy 
 
 1 2 3 4 X Y1 , 1 , ,p p p p          p S S 1                                       (6) 
 
and ensures that the average payoffs of the two players are linearly related,  
 
1 1X Y 0S S     .                                                                        (7) 
 
It should be noted that  1 2 3 4, , ,p p p pp  is the actual strategy given by the value of p .  When 
player Y moves first, Y choses a strategy from the condition, 
 
 1 3 2 4 X Y1 , , 1 , ' ' 'q q q p          q S S 1                                    (8) 
 
and ensures that the average payoffs of the two players a linearly related, 
 
2 2X Y' ' ' 0S S     .                                                                    (9) 
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This analysis shows that the essential idea of Press-Dyson analysis for deriving ZDS strategies 
holds in the APD. 
 
IV.  Application to Central Role of Nice Strategies including TFT 
 
 Axelrod established that the famous tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy submitted by Rapoport was 
efficient since TFT “won” both tournaments [3].  As an example of the anlysis developed here, we 
see how efficient TFT is against an extortionate ZDS.  When X moves first, an extortionate ZDS 
is defined by X selecting the strategy determined by [8], 
 
     1 2 3 4 X Y1 , 1 , ,p p p p P P           p S 1 S 1  .                       (10) 
  
This choice of strategy for X means that the parameters in Eq. (6) are re-expressed as   , 
  , and  1 P    .  Assuming the payoff P  is otherwise known, the extortionate ZDS 
redefines the parameters so that now there are only two free parameters   and  , since 
 P    .  It is clear also that the extortionate ZDS requires that 4 0p   so that X never 
cooperates once both players defect (dd).  Press and Dyson work out the details for the other three 
probabilities.  We do not need that information when Y plays the TFT strategy, 1 3 1q q   and 
2 4 0q q  .  To see this, Eqs. (2) and (4) give X 1 PS  and Y 1 PS .    Furthermore, Eqs. (3) 
and (4) give X 2 PS  and Y 2 PS  using the same strategies for X and Y.   With Eq. (5) this 
means that the average payoffs for X and Y are equal, X YS S P  , which is the Nash equilibrium 
for the PD.  Thus, even when X plays an extortionate ZDS, Y can always ensure a “fair” payoff 
equal to that of X, even if the payoffs are the Nash equilibrium with payoffs less than T  or R .  
This is true independent of the exact extortionate strategy of X.   The TFT strategy is a ZDS 
strategy for X with parameters 1   and 1 5  .  Without necessarily being informed of general 
ZDS analysis, however, Y has chosen a simple strategy that ensures a fair payoff. 
 
The key to the successful defense of Y against extortion by X is the selection of the 
probability 4 0q   so that Y never cooperates once both players defect (dd).  This is clear from 
inspection of the determinants in Eqs. (2) and (3) where the conditions 4 4 0p q   means that all 
determinants derived from Eqs. (2) and (3) are proportional to 4f  and the resulting 3X3 minors 
obtained by eliminating the fourth row and column are all equal (and non-zero).  This is the reason 
k iS P  for all k and i. 
 
There clearly is more to TFT since ensuring a  ,P P  against extortionate strategies 
wouldn’t be enough to win the Axelrod tournaments.  Insight is gained by inspecting Eqs. (2) and 
(3) and asking what is the simplest set of strategies to reach  ,R R , the mutual payoff that is Pareto 
optimal, 2R T S  ?   This can be accomplished by having both determinants in Eqs. (2) and (3)  
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proportional to 1f  which equals R  when X Y,  f S S .  A class of cooperative strategies has
1 1 1p q   so that both players always cooperate when they have cooperated on their previous 
moves.  This condition ensures a payoff R  against many cooperative strategies.  To see this, using 
Eq. (B2) in (4) gives X Y1 1 R S S  for X moving first.  Using Eq. (B5) in (4) gives 
X Y2 2 R S S  for Y moving first.   This means that the average payoffs are given by 
X YS S R   so that the APD results in the Pareto optimal payoff  ,R R  when only cooperative 
strategies with 1 1 1p q   are chosen. Although R  is less than T ,  players will avoid the sucker 
payoff S  so T  payoffs will not happen with significant frequency in a repeated PD.   The 
determinants  
1 1 1
,i p qD  p q  in Eqs. (B3) and (B6) allow for a large (infinite) number of 
cooperative strategies providing payoffs of R .   One such strategy of course is TFT.  This analysis 
suggests why so called “nice” strategies scored well in Axelrod’s tournaments [3].   Press and 
Dyson also pointed out that TFT, played by X will result in the payoff  ,R R  when Y is 
cooperative,  1,1,1,1q , a clearly nice strategy. 
 
 The analysis of the last paragraph did not use the methodology of ZDS.  Press-Dyson 
analysis can be used without identifying ZDS strategies however as demonstrated above.  If ZDS 
analysis were used, then the strategy for X can be selected by the condition 
 
     1 2 3 4 X Y1 , 1 , ,p p p p R R           p S 1 S 1                           (11) 
 
which results in the probability 1 1p  .   Notice the substitution of R  rather than P  in Eq. (11) 
when compared to Eq. (10).  The same line of analysis as in Press and Dyson can then be carried 
out with Y having strategy  3 2 41, , ,q q qq  rather than a full cooperative strategy.  The results of 
course would be the same as in the last paragraph.  The point here is that ZDS does not 
automatically imply extortion or forcing, but can equally be used to analyze the implications of 
cooperation.  Finally, the case of both X and Y using TFT strategies is a singular case.  In the fog 
of play, the payoffs depend on what moves were made after the Markov chain analysis was 
implemented.  Eventually chains of cooperation are developed with payoffs  ,R R , or chains of 
defection are developed with payoffs  ,P P .  The conclusions of this section also follow from the 
synchronous PD of Press and Dyson (see their Fig. 2B [8]) and are consequences of repeated PD 
not of asynchronous or synchronous moves. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
 The asynchronous or sequential prisoner’s dilemma is a robust model for conflict situations 
in which players alternate moves, and payoffs are determined by the current player’s move and the 
move of the previous player.  This asynchronous prisoner’s dilemma places no 
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restrictions on the values of the payoff set R, S, T, P other than the conditions determining a 
prisoner’s dilemma.  In fact, the two conditions determining the prisoner’s dilemma can be 
removed since the analysis is not dependent on these conditions.  Two players can also have 
different payoffs.  This analysis can be applied to many 2X2 games [13,14].  The Press-Dyson 
analysis resulting in zero-determinant strategies is successfully applied to the asynchronous 
prisoner’s dilemma.  As a first example, TFT is shown to be an efficient defense against 
extortionate zero-determinant strategies by guaranteeing a fair result, namely the Nash 
equilibrium.  In addition, the minimally cooperative strategy of both players cooperating when 
they cooperated on the previous move is also shown to be sufficient to reach the Pareto optimal 
 ,R R  payoff in the prisoner’s dilemma.  This suggests why nice strategies fare well in Axelrod 
tournaments. 
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Appendix A 
 
The Markov transition matrix XM for player X moving as in Fig. 2 is given by [10], 
 
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
                       c     
0 0
  
0 0
0 0
0 0
 
1
1
1
1
      
X
cc d dc dd
cc
cd
dc
dd
p p
p p
p p
p p
 
 
 


 
 
 


M
 .                                                              (A1) 
 
The notation, cc, cd, dc, and dd, above and to the left of the transition probability matrix correspond 
to the moves of player X and Y according to the ordering, xy.  The prior move is given down the 
left and the current move is given along top.  This sequence of moves corresponds to the chain of 
moves in Fig. 2 where X only moves.  The blue transition probabilities ip  in Eq. (A1)  are 
conditional probabilities for X to cooperate (c) in the current round depending on the state of the 
previous round:  1 |Probp X c cc ;  2 |Probp X c cd ;  3 |Probp X c dc ; 
 4 |Probp X c dd .   It follows that all entries in which Y moves must vanish, corresponding 
to the red 0 in XM .  The Markov transition matrix YM  for player Y moving as in Fig. 2 is 
 
1 1
3 3
2 2
4 4
1 0 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 1
Y
q q
q q
q q
q q
 
    
  
M .                                                                      (A2) 
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The strategy vector for player X is  1 2 3 4, , ,p p p pp , and that for player Y is  1 3 2 4, , ,q q q qq
[10]. 
 
The Markov matrix 1 X YM M M is the transition matrix for the game of alternating, 
sequential game with player X moving first [10, 12], 
 
       
      
      
      
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2
2 3 2 3 2 4 2 4
1
3 1 3 1 3 2 3 2
4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
p q p q p q p q
p q p q p q p q
p q p q p q p q
p q p q p q p q
    
          
      
M .                                    (A3) 
 
The Markov matrix  2 Y XM M M  is the transition matrix for the alternating, sequential game with 
player Y moving first [10], 
 
      
       
      
      
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
1 3 2 3 1 3 2 3
2
3 2 4 2 3 2 4 2
3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
p q p q p q p q
p q p q p q p q
p q p q p q p q
p q p q p q p q
    
          
      
M .                                    (A4) 
 
Appendix B 
 
 From Eq. (2), 
 
    
 
1
2 3 2 2 4 2
1
3 3 3 2 3
4 3 4 4 4 4
1 1 1
0 0 0
1 1
, , det
1 1
1
p q
f
p q p p q f
D
p p p q f
p q p p q f
 
  

  

p q f ,                 (B1) 
 
so that 
 
   1 1 1
1 1 1 11 1
, , ,p q p qD f D    p q f p q                                                                 (B2) 
 
where 
 
 
 
 
2 3 2 2 4
1 3 3 3 2
4 3 4 4 4
1 1 1
1 1
, det 1 1 0
1
p q
p q p p q
D p p p q
p q p p q
 
  
    

p q .                                  (B3) 
 
From Eq. (3) 
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    
 
1
3 2 3 3 2
2
3 2 4 2 2 3
3 4 4 4 4 4
1 1 1
0 0 0
1 1
, , det
1 1
1
p q
f
q p q q f
D
p q p q q f
p q p q q f
 
  

  

p q f ,                             (B4) 
 
so that 
 
   2 1 2
1 1 1 11 1
, , ,p q p qD f D    p q f p q                                                                (B5) 
 
where 
 
 
 
 
 
3 2 3 3
2 3 2 4 2 2
3 4 4 4 4
1 1 1
1 1
, det 1 1 0
1
p q
q p q q
D p q p q q
p q p q q
 
  
    

p q .                                 (B6) 
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